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ESSAY
Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution:
A Comment on Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
Earl M. Maltz *
The doctrine of stare decisis has been of diminishing importance in constitutional adjudication for a number of years. Rhetorically, appeals to precedent remain important features of Supreme
Court opinions. However, to a number of observers, it has seemed
that no precedent-particularly a precedent dealing with a politically-charged issue-is safe if five Justices disagree with it on the
merits"
Given this background, the structure of the analysis in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Case is surprising. Concluding that the Constitution prohibits states from imposing "undue burdens" on the right of a woman to obtain an abortion, the
majority opinion in Casey relied heavily on the doctrine of stare
decisis3 in refusing to overrule Roe v. Wade.4 Moreover, there is
every indication that for at least some of the Justices, the appeal
to precedent was more than mere rhetoric, but actually had a
substantive impact on their votes.
This Essay will discuss the proper role of precedent in the
abortion controversy. The Essay will begin by juxtaposing two recent pre-Casey decisions that illustrate the Rehnquist Court's approach to stare decisis in other constitutional contexts. It will then
•

Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden).

1 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis and the Overruling of
National League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMM. 341, 351 (1985) ("stare decisis is probably often

only a minor factor in each Justice's voting calculus."); Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on
the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467, 467 ("[i]t seems fair
to say that if a majority of the . . . Court has considered a case wrongly decided, no

constitutional precedent-new or old-has been safe."). But see the sources cited in Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking and Theoy, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 68, 82 n.46 (1991) (precedent still has significant impact in constitutional

adjudication).
2 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
3

Id at 2808.

4

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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analyze the arguments that the Casey majority itself used to justify
its refusal to overrule Roe. The Essay will conclude that, given the
jurisprudential and political climate in which Casey was decided,
precedent should have played no role in the Court's analysis of
the substantive issues in the case.
I.

PRELUDE: PRECEDENT IN THE REHNQUIST
COURT PRIOR TO CASEY

Casey was, of course, not the first case in which the Rehnquist
Court confronted a constitutional problem that had been addressed by the Court in earlier case law. Issues of stare decisis had
previously arisen in a wide range of contexts. While no effort will
be made here to comprehensively review the Court's performance
in this area,5 an examination of the role played by precedent in
the resolution of two issues-the use of Victim Impact Statements
and the extent of state taxing authority---is suggestive of the complex
relationship
between
precedent
and
the judicial
decisionmaking process.
A. Victim Impact Statements in Capital Punishment Cases
Prior to the decision in Casey, the shifting treatment of Victim
Impact Statements ("VIS") had come to symbolize the Rehnquist
Court's approach to the doctrine of stare decisis. The VIS issue
first came before the Court in Booth v. Maryland.6 In capital cases,
Maryland law required consideration of a VIS, which the state
included in its presentence report. In Booth, the VIS was based on
information gathered from the family of two murder victims. The
VIS described the victims' personal characteristics, the severe impact of the crimes on the family, and the family members' opinions and characterizations of the crime and the defendant.
Over four dissents, 7 the Booth Court found the introduction
of the VIS unconstitutional. Justice Powell's majority opinion concluded that the admission of the VIS created a constitutionally
unacceptable risk that the jury might impose the death penalty in
an arbitrary and capricious manner. Powell based his conclusion in
part on the argument that the VIS introduced factors that might
be "wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defen-

5
6
7

Gerhardt, supra note 1, provides such a detailed analysis.
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
Id. at 519-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 515-19 (White, J., dissenting).
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dant"s and that the consideration of such evidence "could result
in imposing the death sentence because of factors about which
the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill."9
Two years. later, the Court considered a similar question in
South Carolina v. Gathers." Gathers challenged the imposition of
the death sentence on a defendant convicted of murder and first
degree criminal sexual conduct. During the sentencing phase of
the trial, the prosecutor read extensively from a religious tract that
the victim had been carrying and commented on personal qualities he inferred from the victim's possession of the tract and a
voter registration card. The defendant argued that the
prosecutor's use of such information rendered the imposition of
'the death sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Again, by a 5-4 vote, the Court adopted the defendant's
position.
Not surprisingly, the majority opinion in Gathers relied heavily
on the reasoning in Booth. Indeed, speaking for the Court, Justice
Brennan treated Gathers as a simple application of the principle of
stare decisis:
The statements placed before the jury in Booth included
descriptions of the victims' personal characteristics .... While
in this case it was the prosecutor rather than the victim's survivors who characterized the victim's personal qualities, the statement is indistinguishable in any relevant respect from that in
Booth."
The four dissenters in Gathers clearly recognized that the stare
decisis issue raised by Booth created significant problems for their
position. Speaking only for himself, Justice Scalia dealt with the
issue by arguing that overruling Booth would not create many of
12
the problems normally associated with abandoning, precedent.
The remaining three dissenters joined an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, 3 which took a different tack. While briefly noting her
willingness to overrule Booth, 4 O'Connor devoted far greater ef-

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

I& at 504.
Id. at 505.
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
Id. at 810-11.
Id. at 823-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 812-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 813-14.
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fort to distinguishing that case from Gathers. Focusing on the fact
that Booth did not involve comments by the prosecutor, she contended that it was not necessary to read the case as establishing "a
rigid Eighth Amendment rule eliminating virtually all consideration of the victim at the penalty stage.""5 Instead, she contended, Booth was susceptible to "a narrower reading . . . which would
allow jury consideration of information about the victim and the
extent of the harm." 6 O'Connor relied on this approach in arguing that the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated in Gathers.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Gathers clearly
reflect the rhetorical significance of the concept of stare decisis in
judicial decisions. Taken alone, however, these opinions do not
establish the impact of that concept on the actual results of cases.
Indeed, a comparison between Brennan and O'Connor's treatment
of Booth supports one of the key tenets of critical legal theory--the
idea that precedent is very malleable and thus not a real constraint on judicial decisionmaking.' 7 Moreover, in Gathers almost
all of the Justices read Booth in a manner consistent with the substantive views that they had expressed in Booth-an outcome also
more consistent with critical theory than the view that precedent is
an important element in the Court's decisionmaking process.
8
Justice White's action in Gathers,"
by contrast, reflects the
substantive importance of precedent to his analysis. White was the
only Booth dissenter to join the Gathers majority. His vote was critical to the Gathers result. Subsequent to the decision in Booth, Justice Powell, the author of the majority opinion, had been replaced
by Justice Kennedy, who joined the Gathers dissenters. Thus if
White had remained with his erstwhile allies in Gathers, the case
would have been decided differently.
A concern for stare decisis provides the only plausible explanation for White's vote. In his brief concurring opinion in Gathers,
White stated that the majority's position would have to be accepted. "[u]nless Booth is to be overruled." 9 Taken together with
White's vote in Booth, two points are implicit in this conclusion.
First, although O'Connor's reading of Booth might have been plau-

15
16
17
(1984).
18
19

Id.
Id. at 814.
Giradeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REv. 473, 529
Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (White, J., concurring).
Id. (citations omitted).
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sible, in White's view the most accurate reading of the case controlled Gathers. Second, White was not sufficiently disenchanted
with the Booth result to overcome his allegiance to the doctrine of
stare decisis.
The Booth/Gathers doctrine proved short-lived, however. It did
not survive the 1991 decision in Payne v. Tennessee.2" Payne involved the imposition of the death penalty in a case that arose
from a particularly grisly murder of a mother and her two year
old daughter. The three year old son of the victim, Nicholas,
witnessed the murder and was brutally assaulted, but survived.
During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor focused
heavily on the effect of the murder on Nicholas. By a 6-3 vote,
with the Gathers dissenters joined by White and David Souter, who
had replaced William Brennan, the Court overruled Booth and
Gathers and refused to vacate the sentence.
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the
general principle that the doctrine of stare decisis is typically accorded less weight in constitutional cases where legislative correction is impossible.2 Rehnquist also argued that the reliance issues
often present in cases involving rights of property or contract had
no application to procedural issues.22 Finally, he focused on the
"spirited dissents" in Booth and Gathers and his view that the rule
from those cases had "defied consistent application by the lower
courts."' In his separate concurrence, Souter also focused heavily
on what he viewed as the "unworkability" of the existing rule. 4
The decision in Payne brought an impassioned dissent from
Thurgood Marshall. 25 In one of his last opinions, he argued that
the only relevant change since Gathers had been in the composition of the Court26 and contended that "[the majority's] impoverished conception of stare decisis cannot possibly be reconciled with
the values that inform the proper judicial function."2 7 He further
contended that "this Court can legitimately lay, claim to compliance with its directives only if the public understands the Court to
be implementing 'principles...

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

founded in the law rather than

111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
Id. at 2610.
I&
Id. at 2611.
Id at 2618-19 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2619-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2622.
Id at 2623.
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then

stated

that

"[c]arried to its logical conclusion, the majority's debilitated conception of stare decisis would destroy the Court's very capacity to
resolve authoritatively the abiding conflicts between those with
power and those without."'
B.

State Taxing Authority and Stare Decisis

Payne became a lightning rod for criticism of the Rehnquist
Court's attitude toward precedent generally.' It did not, however, signal a complete abandonment of the doctrine of stare decisis-even by the most conservative Justices 6n the Court. Quill
&
Corp. v. North Dakota
' provides a dramatic illustration of the continuing power of precedent in some circumstances.
Quill involved a constitutional challenge to a state's attempt to
require an out-of-state mail-order house that had neither outlets
nor sales representatives in the state to collect and pay a use tax
on goods purchased for use within the state. In 1967, the Court
had held in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue"2
that the imposition of a tax where the company had not maintained a physical presence in the state was inconsistent with both
the due process clause and the dormant commerce clause.
Analogizing the taxing problem to personal jurisdiction questions,
the Quill Court overruled the due process holding of Bellas
Hess."3 At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed its com34
mitment to the existing dormant commerce clause analysis.
Admittedly, Quill was not a pure stare decisis case. In Justice
Stevens' majority opinion, precedent-based arguments were closely
intertwined with a 'defense of the merits of the Bellas Hess rule.
Nonetheless, Stevens clearly identified stare decisis as one of the
important factors which influenced his analysis.3 5 In a concurring
opinion, the impact of precedent on Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas was even clearer. They eschewed any discussion of the
merits of the Bellas Hess rule. Instead, they contended that the

28
29
30
at A23.
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 2624 (citation omitted).
Id.
E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Marshall, The Great Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1991,
112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
386 U.S. 753 (1967).
Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1909-11.
Id. at 1911-16.
Id. at 1916.
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reliance interest of the mail-order companies and the possibility of
congressional correction 6 of any error mandated respect for the
doctrine of stare decisis3
C. Summary: The Lessons of Payne and Quill
The juxtaposition of the VIS cases and Quill reveals the complex interaction between precedent and other factors in Rehnquist
Court jurisprudence. First, notwithstanding the theoretical uncertainty of the meaning of prior case law, stare decisis can have an
important influence on the judicial process. White's concurrence
in Gathers is inexplicable in any other terms. Further, this is the
only obvious explanation for the Scalia concurrence in QuilL Second, the impact of prior decisions varies from issue to issue and
from Justice to Justice. 7 Such impact depends on a variety of
considerations, some of which are narrowly doctrinal and others of
which are more broadly political.
In Q ill, doctrinal concerns were clearly the most important
factors in the Court's ultimate conclusions. While the economic
stakes involved, made the case of considerable practical significance, the sales tax issue that was at the heart of the case had no
clear association with either the liberal or conservative political
agenda. Thus, institutional considerations dominated
the
decisionmaking process, a point reinforced by the differences in
the majority's analysis of the due process and dormant commerce
clause issues.
The situation in Gathers and Payne was quite different. The
attack on the attitude of more liberal judges toward the rights of
criminal defendants generally, and the defense of the death penalty in particular, has been a staple of the contemporary conservative political agenda in the United States. Given this reality, it is
not surprising that conservative Justices would be more willing to
ignore or downplay the institutional concerns that underlie the
doctrine of stare decisis in this context. Conversely, Justices with
liberal political views could focus on precedent as a means to
bolster their arguments.
All of these factors came into play in Casey. The interaction
among them, however, produced a somewhat surprising result.

36

part).
37

Id at 1923-24 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in

Gerhardt, supra note 1 at 114-17, reaches a similar conclusion.
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STARE DECISIS IN THE CASEY DECISION
A.

The Facts in Casey

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Caseyas arose
from a constitutional challenge to a number of the provisions of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982" 9 ("the Act").
Among other things, subject to certain exceptions for emergencies,
the Act required (1) that all women seeking abortions be provided
with certain specific information at least twenty-four hours before
the abortion was performed; (2) that all minors seeking abortions
obtain the consent of either their parents or a judge before the
abortion takes place; and (3) that all married women notify their
spouses prior to obtaining abortions. In addition, the Act imposed
a number of reporting requirements on facilities that provide
abortion services.
Casey created great excitement among both pro-choice and
pro-life groups. Three years earlier, in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services4 four Justices, William Rehnquist, Byron White, Antonin
Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy had clearly indicated a willingness to
directly overrule or dramatically scale back the constitutional
protections for abortions provided by Roe v. Wade.". Further, a
fifth Justice, Sandra Day O'Connor, had earlier evinced substantial
discontent with Roe.42 Moreover, in the interim, two of Roe'
strongest supporters, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall,
had been replaced by David Souter and Clarence Thomas, both of
whom were appointed by a President with a strong commitment to
the pro-life position. Both sides of the debate believed that the
stage was set for further erosion of the principles established by

Roe.
Given this background, the ultimate resolution of Casey was.
somewhat of a surprise. The Court upheld all parts of the Act
except for the spousal notification provision. Moreover, it jettisoned the trimester analysis which had formed the basis of postRoe abortion jurisprudence. At the same time, however, a majority
of the Justices also joined an opinion signed jointly by Justices

38 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
39 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990).
40 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
41 Id at 532-37 (opinion of Scalia, J.); id. at 517-20 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
42 Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452-75 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, which reaffirmed what the opinion described as "Roe's essential holding"--that women may
"choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State."4" In reaching this conclusion, the authors of the opinion relied heavily on the doctrine
of stare decisis.
Despite the majority opinion's heavy emphasis on the sanctity
of precedent, only two members of the Court, Harry Blackmun
and John Paul Stevens, actually voted to retain pre-existing law in
its entirety." The authors of the Casey opinion concluded that
the state could make requirements that did not impose an "undue
burden" on the women's right to choose to have an abortion. This
is a test quite different from the trimester analysis that had
formed the basis of the rule announced in Roe itself. Moreover, in
upholding large parts of the Act, the Court explicitly overruled
contrary holdings in cases such as Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologist 45 and Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.46 Nonetheless, respect for precedent clearly
loomed large in the minds of the majority opinion's three authors. Indeed, the opinion implied that, as a matter of first impression, some or all of the authors would have taken a contrary
47
position on the constitutional status of abortion.
B.

Casey's Defense of Precedent Based on'Reliance Interests

Initially, the majority opinion seeks to distinguish Payne by
arguing that overruling Roe would implicate significant reliance interests. Quite sensibly, the opinion does not base this conclusion
on the potential impact of the decision on a woman who might
have engaged in a specific act of sexual intercourse with the expectation that she could obtain an abortion to terminate any resulting pregnancy. Instead, thie Court argues that "for two decades
of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail," and
that "while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly mea-

43
44

Casey, 112 S. C. at 2804.
It. at 2838-43 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 2843-55 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).

45 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
46 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
47 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
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sured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people
who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be
dismissed."4
Close analysis, however, reveals the weakness of this argument.
Admittedly, some people would almost certainly have been adversely affected if Roe had been overruled in its entirety. The interests of two groups stand out. First, many people clearly believe as
a matter of moral/political philosophy that access to abortion in
the United States should be largely unregulated. Second, the lives
of some women (and those of some men as well) will undoubtedly
be disrupted if pregnant women who desire abortions are unable
to obtain them because of stringent state regulations. In making
employment decisions, some of these women may have chosen
particular career paths with both the hope that their working lives
would not be interrupted by childbearing and the knowledge that
existing law protected their right to choose abortion in the event
that they should become pregnant. Apparently, the Court's opinion relies on this group for the source of its reliance interest.
The major difficulty is that even taken together, knowledge of
existing law, reasonable belief that the law would not change, and
disadvantagefrom a change in that law are insufficient to establish
reliance. One must also show that some relevant decision was decisively influenced by the belief that the specific rule would remain
unchanged. In other words, the Court's reliance argument is persuasive if, and only if, one believes that a substantial number of
women would not have entered the workforce if they had believed
that the constitutional protection for abortion might be removed.
The opinion provides no evidence to support this empirical
judgment. Admittedly, the employment choices of some sophisticated women may have been consciously influenced by the general
belief that they would have control over the reproductive process;
however, the continued widespread availability of contraceptives
provides a substantial degree of such control. Given this background factor, the suggestion that many employment decisions
were decisively influenced by a belief that abortion per se would
remain unregulated in the future is speculative at best. Thus, protection of justified reliance does not provide a firm basis for the
Court's argument.

48

Id. at 2809.
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III.

CASEY

AND THE RULE OF LAW

Despite its discussion of reliance and attempts to distinguish
cases such as Payne, much of the Court's argument emphasized
themes analogous to those of Marshall's Payne dissent. The primary thrust of the defense of precedent in the opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter is an appeal to a particular conception of "the rule of law"---the idea that all decisions must be
grounded in "neutral principles." 9 Focusing on "the source of
[the] Court's authority, the conditions necessary for its preservation, and its relationship to the country's understanding of itself as
a constitutional republic,""° the opinion makes two related but
distinct arguments based on this conception. The first is based
upon the need to ensure that the public will continue to accept
the Court's decisions as binding. The second is that adherence to
the rule of law is good in itself.
A. Stare Decisis and Public Acceptance of Judicial Authority
The idea of "legitimacy'---a much discussed term in the literature-is at the core of the first argument. The opinion begins with
a paraphrase of Alexander Hamilton's famous description of the
source of judicial power from The Federalist,51 asserting that
[t]he Court's power lies . . .in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law
means and to declare what it demands ..... [t]he Court must
take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept
its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social
and political pressures having, as such, no bearing2 on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.
While conceding that an inflexible adherence to precedent" was
not a necessary precondition for maintenance of the Court's legitimacy, the opinion contends that insufficient respect for the doc-

49 The seminal discussion of the concept of neutral principles is Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Conslitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
50 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
51 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.
1961).
52 Casey, 112 S. CL at 2814.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 68:11

trine of stare decisis would undermine that legitimacy, and with it,
the Court's ability to command public adherence to its edicts.5"
At its core, this argument is essentially based on two empirical
claims-that the public pays close attention to the Court's reasoning, as well as its results, and that massive disruptions in the fabric
of precedent would bring the Court into disrepute and lead the
public to ignore or disobey judicial authority. In fact, the evidence
of the twentieth century on both points supports precisely the
opposite conclusion. Such disruptions have taken place on two
occasions, and the Court's authority has emerged intact.
The first major disruption occurred in the late 1930s. Prior to
that time, the Court had actively intervened to both protect the
freedom of contract from undue governmental interference5 4 and
to limit the scope of congressional power over economic affairs
generally.5 Beginning in 1937 with the decisions in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish6 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 7 the

Justices reversed course and adopted a basically noninterventionist
posture, deferring on almost all such issues to the decisions of
other branches of government. This shift in approach of necessity
required the Court to either explicitly overrule or eviscerate a
number of important precedents.
The Casey opinion contends that this radical paradigm shift
was justified because new empirical evidence had demonstrated
the bankruptcy of the premises on which prior law had been
based. This argument is not entirely satisfying; nonetheless, the
shift to the Parrish/Jones & Laughlin model can be reconciled with
the Casey model. The post-1937 paradigm shift did not require the
Justices to invoke their own political predilections in preference to
those of previous judges; instead, it generally left ultimate authority in the hands of a third group-governmental officials not serving on the federal courts. Thus the Justices could still claim to be
adopting a neutral position on the political issues before the country.
No such claim can be made with respect to the second major
disruption in precedent-that initiated by the Warren Court in the

53 Id. at 2814-15.
54 E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905).
55 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918).
56 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
57 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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1960s and, in many cases, extended in the 1970s during the early
Burger years. During the Warren and early Burger years, the
Court once again assumed an interventionist posture. Warren
Court interventionism was, however, quite different from that of
the pre-1937 era. The early twentieth century Court had typically
deployed the Constitution in defense of principles generally associated with a conservative political philosophy. By contrast, the Warren Court used the Constitution as a weapon against positions
associated with conservatism. Statutory interpretation followed a
similar course, with statutes dealing with such issues as habeas corpus58 and civil rights59 given new, expansive readings that advanced the liberal agenda.
As in the period immediately following 1937, the new interventionism of the 1960s and 1970s often required the Court to
ignore or downplay the doctrine of stare decisis. On issues such as
criminal procedure,' voting rights,6' and gender-based discrimination, 62 the architects of the new interventionism were required
to overturn case law that directly conflicted with desired results. In
other cases, the Court reached conclusions which were fundamentally at odds with premises that lay at the core of the pre-existing
legal structure. 61 So long as five Justices favored a particular result, these factors did not deter the liberal. interventionists from
reaching their conclusions.
The magnitude of the paradigm shift was reflected in the
number of cases that were actually overruled. In the period from
1960 to 1972, the Court explicitly abandoned prior decisions .on
no less than twenty-nine occasions." To put this number in perspective, Brandeis' famous opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil and

58 E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (procedural default does not bar collateral
attack on conviction).
59 E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Civil Rights Act of 1866
prohibits private racial discrimination).
60 E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942) (right to counsel); Mapp v. 'Ohio, 367 'U.S. 643, 653-55 (1961),
overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (exclusionary rule).
61 E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), overruling Pope v. Williams, 193
U.S. 621 (1904) (durational residency requirements); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966), overruling Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (polf taxes).

62 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), ovemling Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948).
63

E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)

64 Malta, supra note 1, at 494-95.

(death penalty).
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Gas. Co.' listed only twenty-eight instances in which the Court
had overruled itself on constitutional issues in the entire period
prior to 1932,' and used this list to demonstrate that the Court
historically had shown less respect for precedent in constitutional
cases.
With the exception of a reference to Brown, the Casy opinion
ignores the dramatic changes in the Court's approach to precedent that characterized the Warren era. The impact of these
changes was quite unlike that which occurred during the immediate post-1937 era. Warren Court interventionism required currently
serving Justices to elevate their judgments over those of both other
contemporary government officials and jurists who had preceded
them on the Court. Thus, it elevated the Supreme Court to new
heights as a national policy-maker, abandoning the studied neutrality that had characterized its earlier posture.
The reaction of the public to these two major disruptions
belies the assertions of the Court in Casey regarding the centrality
of stare decisis to the public acceptance of judicial review. If those
assertions were correct, then one would expect these rapid, extreme paradigm shifts to severely damage the authority of the
Court as an institution. In fact, no such damage is apparent. Despite vigorous opposition to specific decisions and even vituperative attacks on individual Justices, the institutional position of the
Court remains basically intact.
The Casey opinion, however, argues that an about-face on the
abortion issue would be far more damaging to the authority of the
67
the opinCourt. Analogizing Roe to Brown v. Board of Education,
ion described the abortion decision as a "rare" instance in which
the Court "calls the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in [the Court's] interpretation of the Constitution."' In such
a case
only the most convincing justification ... could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything
but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority
in the first instance. So to overrule under fire in the absence
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285 U.S. 393, 406-11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 406-07 n.2, 409 n.4.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
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of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious
question.6
Even leaving aside the troubling theoretical implications of
the argument, the accuracy of the empirical assumptions on which
it rests is far from clear. The Court's analysis rests on the view
that the public cares at least as much about the process of legal
decisionmaking as the results that the Court reaches, and that
even the appearance of a departure from the tenets of neutrality
will undermine public confidence in the Court. The experience of
the Warren Court, however, conditioned the public to view the
Court as a kind of ultimate substantive authority on fundamental
moral questions. Thus, particularly where divisive moral issues are
involved, it seems more likely that the public will focus its attention primarily on substantive implications of the judgment itself,
rather than the strength of the reasoning underlying the judgment.
The public response to Casey itself provides strong support for
this observation. The analysfs of the decision by the Philadelphia
Inquirer was typical. Initially, its treatment of the case focused entirely on its substantive implications for the right to choose
abortion, ignoring the institutional concerns that provided the
focus for the majority's analysis of stare decisis. The Inquirer characterized Casey as "a good decision" because it "meshes with what
most Americans think. 0 1 Moreover, the substantial excerpt of the
opinion that the newspaper reproduced included very little of the
Court's discussion of stare decisis.7 1 Only several days later, as an
afterthought, did the Inquirer praise the Court for its fidelity to
2
"[t]he rule of law."0
Other reactions to the decision followed much the same pattern. Most often, public discussion was not primarily focused on
institutional questions about the proper role of precedent in judicial decisionmaking, but rather on differing views on the substantive question of abortion rights itself. Pro-choice groups expressed
relief that Roe had not been entirely overruled, but concern that
the Court's support for their views had been eroded. Conversely,
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The Abortion Decision, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 30, 1992, at A10.

71 Two Sharply Divergent Opinions Emerge on Roe v. Wade, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June
30, 1992, at A8.
72 The Rule of Law, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 5, 1992, at E6.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:11

pro-life forces praised the Court for retreating from some of its
more sweeping abortion rights decisions, but voiced disappointment over the continuation of substantial constitutional protection
for abortion rights." While the Casey opinion was at times
praised for its fidelity to precedent, 74 this praise came entirely
from those who supported substantial protection for abortion
rights and had feared that Roe v. Wade would be completely overruled by the Rehnquist Court.
The theoretical problems with the Court's opinion are even
more troubling. The implications of the argument are breathtaking. The analysis reverses the accepted view that interventionist
constitutional decisions should be granted less protection under
the doctrine of stare decisis because they cannot be corrected by
other branches of government. 75 In essence, the opinion asserts
that if one side can take control of the Court on an issue of major national importance, it can not only use the Constitution to
bind other branches of government to its position, but also have
that position protected from later judicial action by a kind of
super-stare decisis.
Applying this approach to Roe itself is particularly inappropriate. In some respects, the Supreme Court's role in the abortion
controversy is unique in its history. Admittedly, in cases such as
Dred Scott v. Sandford6 and Brown v. Board of Education,77 the
Court had attempted to invoke the Constitution to resolve fundamental moral issues on which the nation was deeply-divided. However, in those cases debates over those issues were already deeplyembedded in the national political process. Moreover, the ordinary
workings of the process had failed to resolve the differences between the opposing positions; instead, the contending factions had

73 Public reaction is summarized in Dan Balz & Maralee Schwartz, Issue Passes to Politicians: Decision is Grist for Election-Year Mill, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at Al; Roberto
Suro, The Supreme Court; Outside Court, Rival Rallies and Heavy Politicking, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 1992, at A15. See also The Abortion Ruling, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at A18 (editorial supporting abortion rights in wake of decision).
74 E.g., This Honorable Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A22; The Rule of Law, supra note 72, at E6.
75 Justice Brandeis originally relied on this position to argue that the Court should
feel relatively free to re-examine all constitutional precedents. Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). However, Congress does
have the power to essentially overrule noninterventionist decisions by statute. Maltz, supra
note 1, at 468-72; Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 723, 742 (1988).
76 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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become polarized, with compromise impossible and the overall
functioning of the process distorted.
The situation in Roe was quite different. Unlike cases such as
Dred Scott and Brown, where the Court sought to decisively enter
pre-existing national controversies, Roe actually played a large role
in generating the intense national divisions over abortion rights.
To understand this point, one must begin by examining the state
of the abortion debate prior to the Supreme Court's entry into
the picture. In the five years prior to Roe, state legislatures had
gradually been moving toward the relaxation of the requirements
for a legal abortion. Five states had adopted the position that
abortions could be performed for any reason; two others allowed
abortions for the limited purpose of preserving the life or health
of the mother. 78 The most popular state reform, however, followed the pattern of the Model Penal Code, which provided that
abortions would be lawful in any one of a number of circumstances: if the continuance of the pregnancy posed a substantial risk of
gravely impairing .he physical or mental health of the mother, or
of ultimately producing a child with a grave physical or mental
defect; if the pregnancy resulted from rape; or if the pregnancy
resulted from incest or other felonious intercourse. 79 This pattern
of reform (and in some cases lack of reform) reflected the classic
American legislative process, which. often generates compromise
even on issues which involve deeply felt moral values.
Roe had the effect of polarizing the debate. Fortified by the
oracular authority of the Court, pro-choice forces could now claim
that their position was not only objectively correct, but that support for legal limits on abortion was inconsistent with the most
basic values underlying American society. Conversely, pro-life elements were outraged that Roe had placed the imprimatur of the
Constitution on a practice that they believed to be fundamentally
immoral. The result was that both sides began to strongly resist
even the most minor, reasonable concessions to the opposing
viewpoint.
Given this background, the flaws in the Casey Court's analysis
of the stare decisis issue emerge rather clearly. The analysis cites
the political firestorm created by the holding in Roe as a reason
for refusing to re-examine the holding itself. In essence, the opin-

78 James A. Knight, Note, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion:
The Contradictions and the Problems, 1972 U. ILL L.F. 177, 179-80 & nn.27 & 29.
79 Id. at 180, 181 n.32.
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ion places the defenders of abortion rights in a position much like
that of the child who murders its parents and then asks for mercy
on the grounds that he is an orphan. Such an approach cannot
be the basis of sound doctrine.
B.

Stability of the Law as an Independent Value

Even conceding that the authoritativeness of judicial decisions
could survive an outright reversal of Roe, one might still conclude
that the respect for precedent evinced by the three-Justice opinion
in Casey serves significant, independent values. One might argue
more generally that the system will function better if pre-existing
legal rules, whatever those rules might happen to be, are generally
left unaltered by the Court. This concern for the institutional
structure of the legal system-reflected in the Court's repeated
invocation of the concept of "the rule of law" 8 -transcends
the
simple need for public acceptance that dominates the Casey opinion.
Certain fundamental principles must underlie any evaluation
of this argument in Casey. First, in deciding a case, a judge is
exercising political power-a power inherent in his position. Second, by following a precedent with which he disagrees, the judge
is sacrificing an opportunity to advance his own political agenda,
choosing instead to enhance the authority of the judge or judges
who decided the precedential case.
Why would a judge make such a choice? The only plausible
reason is that his personal political interests are outweighed by the
institutional benefits that accrue from a system based on precedent. Judges and commentators have cited a variety of such benefits."' All of these benefits, however, rest on a single, generally
unstated premise: that the doctrine of stare decisis will control the
actions not only of a single Justice, but of all (or at least of most)
Justices. Put another way, if other Justices do not feel bound by
precedent, a decision by a single judge to follow prior case law
will generate few if any institutional benefits.
This point should not be overstated. Many of the benefits
attributed to the doctrine of stare decisis can still be derived from
a system where the Justices are free to make adjustments at the
margins of existing case law. They might even make occasional

80 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808.
81 The purported institutional benefits derived from fidelity to precedent are summarized in Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 76-87 and Monaghan, supra note 75, at 744-48.
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abrupt departures from established principles in narrowly-defined
areas of the law. However, where most members of the current
Court feel free to make sweeping changes in the basic paradigms
underlying vast areas of the law, or where it seems likely that
Justices appointed in the future will feel free to make such changes, it makes little sense for a Justice to sacrifice his own political
interests by committing himself to a jurisprudence based on precedent.
The more conservative members of the Rehnquist Court operate against the background of just such a situation. Not only did
the Warren Court itself feel free to disregard whatever precedents
it found inconvenient; even after the architects of the Warren
Court revolution lost their judicial majority, they made it clear
that if they ever regained control of the Court, precedent would
not stand in the way of further interventionism in support of their
political agenda.
The death penalty cases provided a particularly clear example
of this attitude. In 1972, retreating from a long series of decisions
which clearly rested on the assumption that imposition of the
death penalty was not cruel and unusual punishment, 2 the Court
held in Furman v. Georgia' that under the procedures then in
place, use of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. The -precise import of Furman was, however, extraordinarily unclear. The case was decided by a 5-4 vote, with all
nine Justices issuing separate opinions 4 and only two-William A.
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall-concluding squarely that any
imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional."5
Not surprisingly, Furman was followed by a flurry of legislative
action, as both the state and federal governments strove to craft
death penalty statutes which would satisfy a majority of the Justices. In a series of decisions beginning with Gregg v. Georgia,6 the
Court used cases arising under these statutes to clarify Furman.
82 E.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (juries may be given untrammeled discretion to decide whether death penalty should be invoked); Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (death qualified juries constitutional).
83 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
84 Id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id at 414-64 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at
405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 375405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 314-74
(Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
85 ld at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 253-306 (Brennan, J., concurring).
86 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Ultimately, shifting majorities of Justices concluded that the death
penalty could in fact be constitutionally applied in some cases,7 but
imposed a detailed set of standards to govern its imposition.
During their service on the Court, Brennan and Marshall
expressly rejected the authority of those holdings which refused to
strike down sentences of death in at least some circumstances. In
addition to dissenting in these cases, Brennan and Marshall consistently dissented from denials of certiorari on death penalty issues,
repeatedly expressing the view that the imposition of capital punishment was unconstitutional under all circumstances. 8 In essence, they concluded that they should not be bound by the doctrine of stare decisis when it conflicted with their personal views of
the relationship of the death penalty to the Constitution.
C.

The LiberalJudicial Ratchet

Viewed against this background, Marshall's vigorous defense of
the doctrine of stare decisis in Payne is perhaps most charitably described as disingenuous. Taken together, his death penalty opinions treat the doctrine of precedent as a kind of liberal interventionist ratchet, preserving the death penalty constraints imposed by
interventionist majorities, but permitting modification or even outright rejection of those decisions which allow states to continue to
impose capital punishment under some circumstances. A similar
attitude is reflected in the liberal approach to issues ranging from
abortion funding to federalism.
Indeed, the language of the Payne dissent itself reflects this
view fairly clearly. Marshall's opinion expresses less concern with
the idea of neutrality generally than with protecting "the authority
and the legitimacy of th[e] Court as a protector of the powerless,"
exemplified by "minorities, women, or the indigent".8 9 He argues
that "stare decisis is in many respects even more critical in adjudication involving constitutional liberties than in adjudication involving
commercial entitlements." The implicit message of the opinion
is that stare decisis exists primarily to protect the ability of the
Court to advance the Warren Court agenda. Where precedent

87 This process is summarized in WILLIAM B. LOcKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 577-610 (7th ed. 1991).
88 E.g., Grubbs v. Missouri, 482 U.S. 931 (1987) (Brennan and Marshall, JI.,dissenting from denial of certiorari); Wingo v. Butler, 482 U.S. 925 (1987) (Brennan and Marshall, J.,dissenting from denial of certiorari).
89 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 2623.
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stands in the way of that agenda, like-minded judges should follow
the Warren Court approach and feel free to disregard prior case
law.
There is no reason to believe that liberal interventionists
would give any greater respect to decisions which leave states free
to impose some restrictions on abortion. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. In Harris v. McRae," only three
years after the Court had held in Maher v. Ro 2 that states need
not fund abortions under the Medicaid program, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun clearly indicated that they would continue
to vote to force governments to provide such funds for indigent
women seeking abortions. One can expect the Casey analysis itself
to receive similar treatment in the event that pro-choice activists
regain control of the Court.
Against this background, the call by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter for fidelity to stare decisis presented the conservative members of the Court with a one-sided bargain. They would
be generally bound to respect Warren and early Burger Court
precedents with which they disagreed-even when the case law
establishing those precedents had itself ignored the doctrine of
stare decisis. At the same time, however, if more liberal Justices
became ascendant once again, conservative precedents would very
likely have little constraining force. To expect fidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis in such circumstances is both illogical and
unrealistic.
IV. CONCLUSION

The import of the Case opinion for future treatment of the
doctrine of stare decisis by the Rehnquist Court is very unclear. In
Payne and other cases all or some of the adherents to the opinion
have signaled their willingness to overrule important precedents in
appropriate circumstance. Moreover, the Casey analysis itself focuses heavily on the unusually strong political crosscurrents that swirl
around the abortion issue. Thus, even with respect to the three
Justices who adhered to the opinion, it seems unlikely to have signaled a general re-emergence of precedent as a decisive factor in
constitutional adjudication.

91 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
92

432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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Even in the narrow context of the abortion issue, however,
the Court's appeal to the concept of precedent is seriously misconceived. One might, of course, argue that the extension of special
constitutional protection to abortion rights is justified on the merits.9" But stare decisis alone cannot justify adherence to Roe, even
in the somewhat diluted form advocated in the Casey opinion.

93 See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976) (defending Roe); Don-

ald H. Regan, Reniting Roe v. Wade, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1569 (1979) (same).

